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THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE
FORMER SOVIET UNION
LISAOSOBAt

Because of the weakness of environmental protection legislation in the former
Soviet Union the former republics of the Soviet Union occupy one of the most
ecologically devastated areas on the planet. The Chernobyl disaster came to
be seen as a symbol ofall that was wrong with the Soviet system by observers
both within and outside the USSR Concerns about safety at existing nuclear
facilities, the disposal of nuclear waste, and the potential migration of nuclear
materials and knowledge out of the former Soviet Union are widespread both
within the republics and internationally. Greater regulatory action on the
national level is required to ensure the support of the international
community, and to provide some certainty that minimum levels of safety are
being achieved. The international community needs to contribute a creative
approach to regulation of the nuclear industry, allowing for some local input
and strengthening international institutions. The sovereignty of nations must
be balanced against the need for international environmental security zn
order to achieve progress in the regulation of the nuclear industry.

A cause

de la faiblesse des lois sur la protection de l'environnement dans
l'ancien Union sovietique, !es anciens republiques de !'Union sovitftique
occupent une region du monde qui se trouve parmi !es regions de la planete
!es plus ravagees par la pollution. Le desastre a Chernobyl est devenu un
symbole, selon des observateurs a l'interieur ainsi qua l 'exterieur de l'URSS,
de tout ce qui ne marchait pas avec le systeme sovietique. Des soucis au sujet
de la securite des reacteurs nucleaires actuels, de l'enlevement des dechets
nucleaires, et de la possibilite de la migration des materiaux nucleaires sont
omnipresents. Les republiques ont besoin de plus de reglementation au
niveau national pour assurer le soutien de la communaute internationale, et
pour assurer un niveau minumum de securite. La communaute internationale
a besoin d'une faron creative d'aborder le probleme de la reglementation de
l'industrie nucliaire, une solution qui tient compte de !'opinion locale et qui
renforce !es institutions internationales. Pour avoir du succes a reglementer
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!'industrie nucleaire, il faut peser la souverainte des nations et la necessiti de
la securite environnementale internationale.

I. INTRODUCTION
[T] he fragility of the sarcophagus built around the
crippled reactor in a desperate attempt to contain its
radioactive poisons resembles the vulnerable, unstable,
and fragile condition of the members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States ....

Ellen Bober Moynagh, "The Legacy of Chernobyl: Its Significance
for the Ukraine and the World" 1
The daunting problems surrounding the nuclear industry in the
states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are a
powerful example of the legacy of the political and economic forces
which were at work in that part of the world during the greater part
of the present century. Today, in the young nations of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (c1s), new governments
struggle to extricate themselves from the past and at the same time
to cope with astounding challenges arising from the political
transformations of their countries. Tremendous economic and
ethnic pressures have forced environmental issues to remain at a low
priority level; in this sense, little has changed since the years of
Soviet rule, except that the pressures are now greater than ever. Yet
vast areas of the former Soviet Union can be considered "ecological
disaster zones," from the fouled shores of the Baltic Sea and the
pollution-choked Ob and Volga river basins, to the acid-rainravaged forests of the far east. In the context of this critical state of
affairs, what can traditional notions and mechanisms of
international environmental law offer to the states of the former
Soviet Union in an attempt to help them overcome the
environmental problems which plague them?
This paper will examine the genesis of the massive
environmental problems in the former Soviet Union, as well as the
relationship between those problems and the breakup of the Soviet
Union. Next, it will assess the particular difficulties and dangers

1

(1994) 21 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 709.
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associated with the nuclear industry, and the current strengths and
weaknesses of the international regimes and funding schemes which
deal with the industry. The paper will also address the question of
what will need to be done in the future to deal more effectively
with the issue of nuclear regulation in the former Soviet Union.
Finally, it will conclude by examining the ultimate question which
arises from the paper: to what extent can the pursuit of sustainable
development and protection for all of the world's nations be
balanced against the right to some sense of state sovereignty for the
nations with the most severe problems?

II. ENVIRONMENTAL LAWIN THE SOVIET UNION
1. Ecology in Soviet Thought
The region including Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
is one of the most thoroughly ecologically devastated areas on the
planet, and Soviet political domination of the region during most
of this century provides a key to the reason for that environmental
destruction. The Soviet version of Communist ideology centred on
the creation of wealth for the common good, but with little or no
regard for the environmental costs of such a policy. The emphasis
was on productivity and continually increasing industrialization,
and any concerns which conflicted with those goals were brushed
aside. 2 The environment and human safety were two such concerns
which were generally not addressed. Starting with Stalin's first fiveyear plan, introduced in 1928, citizens were encouraged throughout
the Soviet era to support massive industrialization based on the view
"that nature's wealth is virtually inexhaustible and that it is man's
fate to conquer and reshape nature." 3 This approach to natural
resource use has been appropriately dubbed "gigantomania." 4 The
Khrushchev era saw the development of wilderness areas and
attempts to harness the power of some of the Soviet Union's largest

2

Ibid at 723.
Donald R. Kelley, et al., The Economic Superpowers and the Environment (San
Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1976) at 135.
4
Sergei Zalygin, "A Brief Summary of the Report 'Ideology and Ecology'"
(1992) 19 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 635 at 635.
3
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rivers, while the Brezhnev government sustained its profligate
spending through unprecedented exploitation of the environment. 5
There was some recognition in the scientific community during
the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years that the country's economic
policies might be devastating the environment, but little was
accomplished in response to that concern. The government refused
to admit to any problems, citing the proposition that pollution
would simply never occur in a socialist society, since no citizen
would want to burden his or her "brethren" with pollution which it
would be the responsibility of the State (meaning the people) to
clean up. Since the government declared that pollution could not
exist, it certainly could not take responsibility for it by preventing
or addressing it. 6 There is some indication that the government was
aware of the existence of pollution but refused to acknowledge it.
For example, in September of 1972, the Supreme Soviet devoted an
entire session to conservation and pollution problems, but still did
not admit to the magnitude of the problems, partly due to the
ideological convictions discussed above, and partly due to
embarrassment. 7
2. The Unassailable State

Consciousness of environmental damage, while it existed within
scientific circles, was not encouraged in the population as a whole
under the Soviet regime for a variety of reasons. First, there was a
long tradition of suppressing information about state activity, which
extended to environmental concerns. M.C. Millionshchikov, who
was First Deputy Chairman of the u.s.s.R Academy of Sciences in
the mid-l 970s, stated stiffly: "We treat these problems a little
differently. Open discussion in the press and in public does not
always produce a review of the problem from the right point of
view. We try to consider this in scientific discussion, not in public." 8
All data on pollution was treated as a state secret, and the statecontrolled media censored any information on environmental

5

Kathleen M. Maloney-Dunn, "Russia's Nuclear Waste Law: A Response to the
Legacy of Environmental Abuse in the Former Soviet Union" (1993) 10 Ariz. J.
Int'! & Comp. L. 364 at 376.
6
Moynagh, supra note 1 at 726.
7
Kelley, supra note 3 at 133.
8
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destruction. 9 An added difficulty was that non-state-sponsored
citizen organizations of any kind were prohibited until the late
1980's, making public pressure on the government extremely
difficult, if not impossible. Criticism was further precluded in that,
where environmental laws and regulations did exist, they were
largely unpublished, even at the Union or Republic level. 10 To
complete its armour of invincibility, the state was immune from
prosecution, even though the state owned most of the u.s.s.R's large
and potentially polluting industries. 11
3. Ineffectiveness of Legislation
The Soviet government did eventually direct its attention to
environmental regulation. In fact, by 1987, the Soviet Union had
enacted over one thousand pieces of legislation on environmental
protection, and the 1977 Soviet Constitution gave paramountcy to
environmental values. 12 But legislation was by and large extremely
vague and aspirational in nature; one author comments that Soviet
environmental laws "served primarily to provide an image of
balance and accomplishment for communism" and were not meant
to effect any significant change in the system. 13 Even if there was
some genuine willingness on the part of Soviet leaders to discuss
solutions to environmental problems, it was countered by the
intransigence of potential violators and of local state organizations.
The system of production goals and arbitrary deadlines obsessed
both factory managers and bureaucrats, who quite regularly
sidestepped responsibility for environmental infractions.
Information on violations was frequently withheld or falsified so
that production quotas could be met. 14 These practices are
unsurprising, considering that the fulfillment of production quotas
often resulted in bonuses and promotions, while a failure to meet
them would likely have caused the loss of an official's job.

9

Maloney-Dunn, supra note 5 at 385.
Ibid. at 386.
II
Moynagh, supra note 1 at 729.
12 M al oney-Dunn, supra note 5 at 375.
13 Moynagh, supra note 1at729.
14 M al oney-Dunn, supra note 5 at 385.
10

172

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

4. Structural Weaknesses
The Soviet system contained several organizational faults which
made the enforcement of environmental legislation nearly
impossible. A multitude of different ministries and agencies were
charged with responsibility for environmental compliance, creating
a maze of responsibility which often precluded any real leadership.
Moreover, the same ministries which were responsible for
environmental protection were also responsible for the use of natural
resources, so that they acted as "foxes in the hen house," in the
words of one Soviet official. 15 That comment was made in 1991,
just before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, demonstrating the
persistence of these problems into the present decade. Further, the
system of centralized monopoly planning which existed in the
Soviet Union was such that the same powers that created the laws
were charged with enforcing them, so that ministries often violated
their own provisions. Enforcement agencies lacked the authority,
staff, and independence required to prosecute violators, and the
court system was not equipped to punish them. 16 On the rare
occasions where polluters were caught by the state, sanctions often
involved a stiff fine and some sort of public condemnation.
However, fines were usually paid by the state in the end (especially
since most large industries were owned by the state), and actual
environmental recovery of the sites was neglected. 17
Although glasnost (the goal of openness or self-examination)
contributed somewhat to opening up public discussion of
environmental concerns, and perestroika (a program of economic
restructuring and decentralization) accelerated the development of
environmental laws in the 1980s, 18 the Soviet Union's environmental
problems were far from solved.

15

Kakimbek Salykov, "The Enforcement of Environmental Protection
(1992) 19 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 581 at 583.
Maloney-Dunn, supra note 5 at 384.
17
Ibid. at 387.
18
Ibid. at 384, 386.
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III. LINKING ENVIRONMENTALISM AND
NATIONALISM: CHERNOBYL AND THE DEMISE
OF THE USSR
1. The Chernobyl Disaster

In the days following April 26, 1986, the extent of the inability of
the Soviet system to adequately deal with environmental problems
was starkly demonstrated to the world. The explosion of one of
four reactors at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Ukraine
was the greatest peacetime nuclear disaster in history, exceeded
only by the bombings of Hiroshima and N agasaki. 19 The explosion
released about fifty tons of radioactive fuel into the atmosphere,
deposited seventy tons of fuel in the area immediately surrounding
the site, and left a further fifty tons of fuel in the vicinity of the
reactor, which would later be enclosed in a concrete sarcophagus. A
recent study finds that one hundred million curies of long-lived
radioactive fallout were released from the explosion, twice as much
as the original estimate. 20 Plans were made for the evacuation by
1991 of 189,000 residents of the areas most severely affected, but it
took until 1990 for surveys to be completed, showing that 73,000
of those people should indeed be evacuated. Victims of the
accident receive special compensation under legislation in the
Republics affected; in Russia the amount given was 300 rubles per
month as of June 1992, which at that time amounted to $3.50
(u.s.). This is the equivalent of one-third the minimum monthly
pay in Russia. 21
In the Ukraine, shrinking state revenues have meant that even
the meagre benefits originally offered can no longer be provided by
the government. For example, those who helped with the clean-up
effort after the explosion are theoretically entitled to compensation
for medical costs. But the health-care system is in such chaos that
these patients are often asked to pay for even the most basic of
19

L.F.E. Goldie, "Pollution from Nuclear Accidents" in Daniel B. Magraw, ed.,

International Law and Pollution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1991) 196 at 213.
20
Mike Edwards, "Living With the Monster-Chernobyl" 186(2) National
Geographic (August 1994) 100 at 104.
21
Robert K. Temple, "Regulation of Nuclear Waste and Reactor Safety Within
the Commonwealth ofindependent States: Toward a Workable Model" (1994) 69
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1071 at 1095.
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treatments. 22 Meanwhile, the official death toll from the accident
was thirty-one, but Ukrainian officials have claimed that between
six and eight thousand people have died as a result of the accident
and cleanup efforts. 23

2. Chernobyl: Metaphor for the Soviet System
The Chernobyl disaster came to be seen as a symbol of all that was
wrong with the Soviet system by observers both within and outside
the u.s.s.R .. News of the accident spread extremely slowly due to
the fact that the plant operators, local government, and the Soviet
government each in their turn first denied and then downplayed
the seriousness of the event until the evidence of the fallout was too
clear to be denied. The central government in Moscow refused to
make any statement to the rest of the world until after it had
dispatched and waited for the return of a team of experts to
Chernobyl to inspect the condition of the reactor. Thus, the terse
acknowledgment by the Soviets to the international media that
there had been "an accident" at Chernobyl in which "one of the
reactors was damaged" did not come until several days after the
event had occurred. 24 Meanwhile, rain from the radioactive cloud
resulting from the accident was falling on many parts of Europe,
where governments were oblivious to the danger and did not take
preventative actions. Further, personnel at the nuclear plant and a
few local government officials were blamed and punished for the
accident, while central government officials who committed the
equally grave blunder of failing to publicize the accident took no
responsibility for their roles in the disaster. In short, one writer has
noted that the Chernobyl accident demonstrated "the persistence
of the tradition of emphasizing productivity at all costs, of
employing secrecy, altering vital statistics, and engaging in
.
,,25
scapegoatmg.

22 Quick.law online newfile CPRE (Canadian Press Recent), Foreign General
News, July 27, 1995.
23
Temple, supra note 21 at 1096.
24
Goldie, supra note 19 at 212.
25 Moynagh, supra note 1 at 727.
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3. Environmentalism's Role in Nationalism
The Chernobyl accident occurred at a time when nationalist
sentiments in the Republics of the then-Soviet Union were at an alltime high, and when glasnost was making it increasingly possible for
citizens to speak out against government practices which they saw as
unfair. These same conditions brought about the 1991 dissolution
of the Soviet Union. Interestingly, many observers believe that there
is a strong link between the two events; some even hypothesize that
the breakup of the u. s. s. R. can be traced directly back to
Chernobyl. The nuclear disaster was a watershed within the
republics because "Chernobyl became identified with the duplicity
and failure, indeed the complete bankruptcy of the Soviet system as
a whole. It also served to mobilize large masses of people against the
system." 26 The event was one in a long history of examples of the
central government's dealings with environmental issues. Often,
Moscow had been intent on developing nuclear and chemical plants
and other dangerous industries in the republics, without heeding
the concerns of local groups or considering other alternatives; this
gave rise to localism and distrust of the central government. 27
Marshall Goldman hypothesizes that environmentalism and
ethnic awakening are very strongly connected in recent Soviet
history, and that almost every nationalist and ethnic stirring that
occurred during Gorbachev' s term of office originated within the
environmental movement. During the glasnost period, it was natural
that those with nationalist tendencies sought out other citizens who
had demonstrated a willingness to speak out against the central
government. Virtually the only people who had dared criticize the
government and who were not in jail as a result were
environmentalists, so that it is not surprising that many
environmental activists were drawn into nationalist and even
separatist factions in the republics. 28 Another commentator reports
that amongst a conference of Soviet environmentalists from various

26

Ibid. at 740, quoting from Roman Solchanyk's introduction to Ukraine: From
Chernobyl to Sovereignty.
27

Charles M. Haar, "Foreword: A Report on the Bellagio Conference on U.S.U.S.S.R. Environmental Protection Institutions" (1992) 19 B.C. Envtl. AfI. L. Rev.
481at484.
28
Marshall I. Goldman, "Environmentalism and Ethnic Awakening" (1992) 19
B.C. Envt!. Aff. L. Rev. 511at511-513.
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republics just before the 1991 coup attempt which led to the
demise of the u.s.s.R.,
there was a sense that the Center never could overcome
its past sins: its exploitation of the nation's environment
and natural resources, the ruined health and threatened
safety of its citizens, and its disregard of the republics'
views. Hence, the breakup of the Soviet Union may have
hinged more on environmental dissatisfaction than
anyone hitherto had suspected. 29

IV. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION

1. Environmental Realities
The legacy of the Soviet disregard for environmental protection is
summed up in the astonishing fact that close to 180 million exSoviet citizens (about twenty percent of the population of the
republics) have been said to live in "ecological disaster zones," while
another 35-40% reside in "ecologically unfavourable conditions." 30
In Russia specifically, scientists have determined that fifteen percent
of the land is "ecologically unsafe" for humans. 31 In 1989, it was
found that three-fourths of the surface water and one-third of the
groundwater in Russia were classified as too polluted to drink. As a
consequence, a 1990 poll found that ninety-eight percent of
Muscovites were more concerned with water pollution than with
crime, aids, or the drastic food shortages that were and still are a
reality. 32 As a result of "an unprecedented combination of adverse
environmental, economic, and social factors," there has been a
record decrease in the average life expectancy of Ukrainian men by
ten years and of Ukrainian women by five years in comparison with
other industrialized nations. There have also been record increases
29

Haar, supra note 27 at 486-487.
Maloney-Dunn, supra note 5 at 389. Inference from an estimate made in 1989
by Alexei Yablokov.
31 Tempe,
I supra note 21 at 1071.
32
M. Evelyn Woods, "International Environmental Aid to the States of the
Former Soviet Union: A Case Study Focusing On Siberia's Lake Baikal" (1994) 5
Colo. J. Int'! Envtl. L. & Policy 459 at 459.
30
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in the number of deaths, cancers, immunodeficiencies, and mental
disorders in the Ukraine. 33

2. Economic and Political Burdens
The frightening realities listed above are only a few of the horrors
faced by the republics of the former Soviet Union, but these states
lack the financial resources and political stability to effectively deal
with them. In a state such as the Ukraine, the government's
ambitious goals are undermined by the fact that the economy is on
the verge of collapse; the ongoing cleanup from Chernobyl
consumes approximately fifteen percent of the national budget, 34
while hyperinflation is so significant that it threatens to cause social
uprisings. 35 The Russian ruble, too, declined in value from $0.008
u.s. in July 1992 to less than $0.001 u.s. in October 1993, resulting
in economic chaos. 36 Furthermore, in some republics, there is an
ongoing tug of war between former Communist officials who
would like to protect the Soviet economic status quo and reformers
who would like to see a rapid conversion to a market economy. 37
Meanwhile, new political structures in the Commonwealth of
Independent States are still in their formative stages. In Russia, for
example, regional governments are demanding autonomy, while
officials in Moscow are fighting to remain in control of all Russian
activities. Incomplete relinquishments of jurisdiction have been the
result, which are a source of further confusion and frustration. For
example, a 1993 document from the Ministry of Ecology and
Natural Resources in Moscow mandated that all proposed foreign
investment enterprises involving large-scale construction with the
potential to harm the environment be subjected to a state ecological
examination. It granted the right to conduct these examinations to
the local republic or city government, if the foreign investment
involved totaled less than 100 million rubles (about $58,000 u.s.).
However, the central Ministry would conduct any investigations

33
Yuri Scherbak, "Strategy for Survival: Problems of Legislative and Executive
Power in the Field of Environmental Protection in the Ukraine" 19 B.C. Envtl. Aff.
L. Rev. 505 at 506.
34
Edwards, sunra
note 20 at 105.
3:r
' Moynagh, supra note 1 at 742.
36
Temple, supra note 21 at 1105.
37
Woods, supra note 32 at 466.
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involving larger amounts of investment. 38 Local authorities were
frustrated by this approach since it meant that the decisions which
would undoubtedly have the most significant effect on them would
be taken out of their hands and entrusted to a distant central
government insensitive to local needs.
The extinguishment of the central government has created
other difficulties. One new problem lies in the fact that
environmental expertise was traditionally centered in Moscow, but
now each republic must acquire the information and expertise
necessary to solve environmental problems. 39 Further, the republics
suffer from the absence of comprehensive legislation on topics such
as nuclear or hazardous wastes. During the existence of the Soviet
Union, each republic had its own environmental legislation and
subordinate acts, but rather than dealing with environmental
preservation in a holistic way, the acts regulated resources
separately-for example, one statute might deal with water,
another with minerals, and yet another with forests. 40 New
legislation which has been created still tends to suffer from the
same problems that Soviet legislation displayed: vague terms, a lack
of enforcement provisions, and the inability to put it into practice in
any case because of financial difficulties. 41 Problems of enforcement
stem partly from the fact that many former Soviet officials are still
in office in the newly created republics, and find it easy to slip back
into corrupt or inefficient practices. Government departments have
in many cases not altered their narrow approaches to problems. 42

V. THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY: A CASE STUDY
1. Special Status of the Nuclear Industry in the Former Soviet
Union

Perhaps no other topic of environmental concern forms a better case
study in the current problems of the Commonwealth republics than
the regulation of the nuclear industry. Both the safety of the nuclear

38

39
40
41
42

Ibid. at 466-467.
Maloney-Dunn, supra note 5 at 417.

Ibid. at 379.
Moynagh, supra note 1 at 741.
Salykov, supra note 15 at 583.
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reactors and the management of radioactive wastes present
problems which are of great magnitude in both national and
international contexts. Amongst all of the areas which were subject
to Soviet secrecy and propaganda, the nuclear industry was the
target of a particularly massive campaign to portray it as completely
safe. The nuclear industry was seen as a key element in the
industrial superiority of the u.s.s.R. and also formed an obvious
cornerstone of the Union's military might during the Cold War
era. Today, a sense of reliance on nuclear power is still prevalent in
the Commonwealth republics, especially one such as the Ukraine,
where there is little or no access to other forms of energy, except
through Russia, which no longer subsidizes the provision of oil and
gas. 43 The political and economic instability in the republics prevent
them from improving infrastructure and decreasing reliance on
nuclear energy. 44 If the governments were to close down plants
which have a high risk of accidents similar to Chernobyl, they
would eliminate precious jobs, which would severely threaten the
stability of the government. In these economically desperate times,
citizens are more focused on immediate survival than on long-term
effects of their actions such as environmental pollution. These
economic and political realities contributed to the decision of the
Ukrainian government to revoke their earlier promise that they
would shut down Chernobyl (whose three functional reactors
continued operating after the fourth melted down) by the end of
1993. In spite of the desirability of that goal, the government
seemed to have no other choice than to revoke its promise in light
of the fact that it claimed that the republic would not have enough
energy to get through the winter of 1992-93. 45 The deadline for
closing down the plant has now been set for the year 2000, although
even that will be dependent on the government obtaining a certain
amount of foreign aid to accomplish the shutdown properly.

2. Nuclear Safety Concerns
Chernobyl is not unique in presenting the risk of another major
nuclear accident. In fact, nearly one-half of the twenty-six reactors
43
44

45

Moynagh, supra note 1 at 743.
Ibid at 709.

QuickLaw online newsfile
News, October 16, 1992.

CPRE

(Canadian Press Recent), Foreign General
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operating in Russia alone are considered unsafe. Further, all fiftyeight of the Soviet-built reactors in the region have "serious
technical and operational flaws that require immediate
modification or shutdown." 46 Current fears are not only that
another major explosion like the one at Chernobyl could occur, but
that simple neglect of maintenance of power plants is causing
gradual environmental contamination through leakages of
radioactive material. It has been stated that Russia's nuclear power
stations "are no less dangerous than nuclear weapons." 47 There were
204 recorded "incidents" (one level less dangerous than "accidents"
on the International Atomic Energy Agency's scale of nuclear
mishaps), at nuclear power plants in Russia alone in 1992. 48 In spite
of this fact, as late as 1988, twenty-six nuclear plants were
scheduled for expansion or construction, and in December 1992,
Russia enacted a law planning the construction of at least thirty new
nuclear power plants, which would double the nation's energy
capacity by the year 2010. 49 However, this plan is sharply
contradicted by a more recent statement made by Boris Yeltsin,
who announced in July 1994 that Russia was closing down the
secret nuclear production facility at Krasnoyarsk-26, as the
government had "no plans to build up the country's nuclear
potential." 50 If this is demonstrative of a change in policy on the
part of the government, then it is certainly a positive step towards
reducing reliance on nuclear energy in the former Soviet Union.
3. Disposal of Nuclear Waste
A further problematic aspect of nuclear regulation is the disposal of
radioactive wastes. This problem has been exacerbated, ironically,
by the end of the Cold War and the promises of both the United
States and the former Soviet Union to decommission many of their
nuclear weapons and submarines. For many years, the Soviets relied
on secret dumping of radioactive wastes at a legion of sites in the

46

Maloney-Dunn, supra note 5 at 390, quoting Thomas Halverson, "Ticking
Time Bombs: East Bloc Reactors" Bull. Atom. Sci. (July-Aug. 1993), 43 at 44.
47
Ibid at 391.
48
Ibid at 398.
49
Ibid at 391.
50
RFE/RL Daily Report No. 143, 19 July 1994, available at World Wide Web
site "http://solar.rtd.utk.edu/friends/ news/ refrl/940729 .html".
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Barents and Kara Seas. It was revealed in 1991 that in the thirty
years prior to 1982, the Soviets had dumped into these ocean
waters roughly twice the amount of radioactivity known to have
been dumped by all other nations combined during that period. 51
The material dumped included eighteen nuclear reactors and an
atomic-powered icebreaker. 52 The Soviets also dumped radioactive
material into lakes within their own borders. The most startling
example of this practice is Lake Karachai, into which raw
radioactive materials were dumped beginning in 1951. One Russian
scientist claims that the lake contains 120 million curies of
radioactivity, and two and a half times as many long-lived isotopes
as those released from Chernobyl. As a result, it is estimated that
standing on the shores of the lake for as little as half a minute could
be lethal. 53

4. New Problems Concerning the Nuclear Industry
(i) Generally
The nuclear industry poses significant environmental threats not
only for the Commonwealth republics but for the rest of the world.
It is evident that the fallout from another Chernobyl-style disaster
could once again have effects far beyond the borders of the former
Soviet Union, and that the use of the oceans as a radioactive sink
poses dangers to all nations. However, the economic and political
chaos in the new republics also pose new dangers in the context of
the nuclear industry which were perhaps not present during Soviet
rule.

(ii) Political Conflicts
The fall of the central government "left a vacuum of authority in
the nuclear arena which republican powers have rushed to
exploit." 54 Problems of determining responsibility for dismantling
weapons and nuclear waste disposal have been worsened by inter-

51

James M. Broadus, and Raphael V. Vartanov, eds., The Oceans and
Environmental Security: Shared US. and Russian Perspectives (Washington. D.C.:
Island Press, 1994) at 126.
52 Maloney-Dunn, supra note 5 at 392.
53
Ibid. at 395.
54
Ibid. at 403.
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republic conflicts over nuclear arms and plants. Squabbles between
republics over these issues create dangerous situations which could
easily result in environmental disasters with transboundary effects.
For example, Ukraine's reactor wastes have traditionally been
stored at Krasnoyarsk-26, which is in Russia. But a dispute
developed between the Krasnoyarsk combine and the Ukrainian
government over the method of payment for butter and sugar
normally supplied by the Ukraine, and Krasnoyarsk is now
withholding its supply of empty transport casks. As a result, the
Ukraine is facing a serious storage crisis. 55 Security crises could also
result from tensions between the new republics; as will be discussed
below, the viability of arms-reductions treaties are called into
question by the reluctance of republics like the Ukraine to work
with Russia, its traditional nemesis, in carrying out the terms of the
treaties. 56
(iii) Trade in Nuclear Materials

A further problem is that poor economic circumstances have forced
illicit trade in many objects, including nuclear materials. The sale of
nuclear technology to countries such as India, China, and Iran poses
the possible danger of new weapons proliferation, even if the sale is
purported to be for "peaceful purposes." 57 As their need for hard
currency increases, the Russians have offered to sell their vast
reserves of uranium, estimated to be worth between one billion and
seven billion dollars (u.s.), to other nations needing reactor fuel. 58
There is also a growing threat of a nuclear black market, in which
private companies offer, for example, to carry out underground
nuclear blasts on ex-Soviet territory. A Russian corporation called
CHETEK recently wrote to the United Nations offering to rid other
countries of their nuclear weapons and wastes by detonating them
in this fashion. 59
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(iv) Nuclear "Brain Drain"

Additionally, there is the question of where the vast numbers of exSoviet citizens who were employed in the nuclear industry will go as
the industry gradually shrinks. One u.s. estimate stated that
900,000 Soviets worked in the nuclear weapons industry alone. Of
these, approximately 2000 are thought to know how to design
nuclear bombs; 3000-5000 more have experience in uranium
enrichment or plutonium manufacture. Many of these also had toplevel security clearance in the Soviet Union. The number of nuclear
experts is difficult to estimate, however, because nobody knows
exactly how many closed or secret nuclear cities existed in the
Soviet Union. Estimates of between 10 and 87 of these cities have
been offered. In August 1992, President Yeltsin ordered that 16
Russian regions and cities which produced radioactive materials be
closed. 60 Although Russia has pledged to use special pay raises and
incentive packages to keep nuclear scientists within its borders, the
economic realities in the country are such that it is unlikely that all
of these knowledgeable individuals will resist the temptations of
more lucrative international contracts. There are real fears that there
will result a massive "brain drain" of nuclear knowledge out of
Russia and to countries where commitments to safe, or even
peaceful, use of nuclear technology may be much less certain.
Accordingly, some feel that the danger of increased nuclear use
may soon be greater than it was at the peak of the Cold War. 61
Certainly, the new uncertainty in the former Soviet Union as it
affects the nuclear industry poses new security and environmental
risks to the world at large.
VI. THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR
NUCLEAR REGULATION

1. Generally

What does the international regime currently in existence have to
offer the states of the former Soviet Union in dealing with the
problems associated with the nuclear industry? The new republics, it
is evident, will need international assistance in properly regulating
60

61

Ibid.
Ibid.

at 411.
at 409.

184

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

and cleaning up their nuclear industries, in light of their
extraordinarily strained political and economic situations.
Moreover, we have seen that the current state of the industry
presents clear risks to both the republics themselves and to the
broader international community. In spite of this, it is argued that
the schemes which exist, including international conventions and
organizations, are not currently adequate to deal with the special
circumstances of the former Soviet Union. This section will consist
mainly of an examination of international nuclear organizations,
some of the conventions which have arisen concerning nuclear safety
and liability, and the main convention relating to ocean dumping of
nuclear waste. It will also briefly touch on two nuclear nonproliferation treaties. This is not intended to be an exhaustive
examination of every international instrument which affects the
nuclear industry, but rather a look at some key examples which
illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the present regime.
2. International Organizations
(i) Euratom and the IAEA

There are two major organizations which deal with the regulation of
the nuclear industry internationally. These are the International
Atomic Energy Agency (the IAEA) and the European Atomic
Energy Community (Euratom). The former Soviet Union is
outside Euratom' s geographical mandate; at any rate, Euratom
leaves many important regulatory aspects to the IAEA, which has
emerged as the dominant agency in the nuclear arena. In fact, the
European Parliament stated in a resolution passed after Chernobyl
that it hoped that the IAEA would play a more effective role in
defining safety standards and that the IAEA was indeed the most
suitable body to take on these tasks, since Eastern European states
were IAEA members. 62
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(ii) The IAEA Mandate

The IAEA shares responsibility for nuclear activities with the United
Nations. As a body set up by the U.N., it is entitled to direct
recourse to the Security Council in cases where peaceful cooperation
with its directives is in jeopardy. This is a power which has been
granted to no other international organization. 63 Yet the standards
set by the IAEA have no binding legal force, and effectiveness is
entirely dependent on cooperation from national governments. The
focus of the Agency's work has shifted in recent years from
developing standards to actually enforcing standards and
guidelines. A reflection of this shift can be found in the
development of the "International Chernobyl Project," which has
sent over two hundred scientists from twenty-five different
countries to the former Soviet Union in the course of fifty different
missions. These missions were charged with assessing the
environmental and health situations in areas affected by nuclear
reactors, and evaluating the measures currently being taken by local
officials. The missions provide recommendations on how better to
measure radioactive contamination and to protect against it. 64
(iii) Difficulties in Enforcing Nuclear Safety

Elena Molodstova draws a distinction between the effectiveness of
programs concentrating on radiation protection (such as the
Chernobyl project described above) and those which focus on
nuclear safety. The problem with the IAEA's programs in the latter
area, she notes, is that they still reflect the Agency's inability to
focus on the implementation of nuclear safety standards. This
inability derives from the fact that nuclear safety standards are still
not widely accepted, which can in turn be partly explained by the
fact that such standards are perceived as involving a critique of a
nation's scientific, technical and operational success in the field. 65 In
this way, the imposition of nuclear safety programs is more
intrusive than the implementation of radiation protection measures,
and may be viewed as an infringement on national sovereignty.

63

Ibid.
Ibid.
65
Ibid.
64

at 204.
at 210.
at 214, 254.

186

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

3. Conventions on Nuclear Safety

(i) Generally
Since the accident at Chernobyl, several conventions have been
brought into existence which have dealt with the problem of nuclear
safety, representing significant improvements to the conventions
which existed previously, but an examination of their
implementation reveals that they all have significant limitations.
(ii) The 1986 Conventions
The disaster spawned the 1986 Convention on the Early Notification
of a Nuclear Accident, 66 a direct result of the concerns of
neighboring governments which were not informed of the accident
in a timely manner. However, the main limitation of this
convention is that although the u.s. and the u.s.s.R. were parties to
it, they both made reservations with regard to its mandatory
dispute resolution mechanisms. Thus, the effectiveness of the
convention is severely limited since an essential enforcement
component of it will not apply to the parties who may be those
most likely to require it. 67 In the absence of such a provision, what
sanctions can the IAEA apply to a country that fails to give proper
notice? It has been noted that withdrawing technical assistance just
when a country has demonstrated that it needs it most would be
counterproductive for all parties. 68 A further problem with the
Convention is that it is left up to individual countries to determine
whether an accident occurring within their boundaries will cause
transfrontier pollution.
The response to Chernobyl also included the Convention on
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency. 69 However, the scope of this convention as well as that
of the Early Notification Convention was so limited that neither
one addresses the basic question of nuclear safety. They do not set
binding minimum safety standards or reinforce safety regulations;
they also do not address the question of whether states which fail to
26 September 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1370 (1986).
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meet certain safety requirements and thereby cause a nuclear
accident can be held liable for resulting damage by other nations. 70

(iii) State Sovereignty and Nuclear Safety
The reluctance to directly address nuclear safety issues stems in part
from fears of a loss of state, sovereignty, which have ensured that
international nuclear safety regimes remain in the domain of "soft
law." In 1987, the Director General of the IAEA stated that "[i]t is
dear that the ultimate responsibility for nuclear safety rests with our
member States. Only national authorities have the capacity to
establish detailed safety and radiation protection rules and to
supervise and enforce their implementation." 71 At the same time, he
also recognized the need for greater cooperation between states and
the possibility that an international safety regime would become
necessary. Similar sentiments were expressed at the International
Conference on Nuclear Safety convened in September 1991 in
Vienna by the IAEA. There, it was declared that there was a need for
an integrated approach which would be adopted by all
governments. Again, the basic premise is that national governments
are to retain some control over the implementation of an
international regime: "states are to retain 'prime responsibility,
preeminence, and hegemony in its regulation."' 72 The conference
also recommended that a framework of independent regulatory
organizations be established to ensure the safe use of nuclear power,
although this goal has not yet been met.

(iv) The New Nuclear Safety Convention
The Convention on Nuclear Safety which arose out of the 1991
conference was opened for signature in 1994. 73 One early analysis of
it found that it still had many shortcomings in that it dealt with
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nuclear safety and radiation protection together and in too general
a manner, and did not specify standards to be met in either area. 74
However, although it fails to create a clearly binding international
regime for nuclear safety, it does establish a system of
accountability for nations which may, over time, impose needed
global safety standards. Meetings of the parties must be held at
least once every three years according to the terms of the
agreement, and countries which do not adopt relevant IAEA safety
standards will have to explain why they have not done so. It is
thought that the international pressure thus generated will be
enough to gradually ensure that a minimum level of safety is
achieved. The parties to the agreement (which include Russia and
the Ukraine) must work toward a legal, regulatory and
administrative framework for the nuclear industry within their own
countries, and are obligated to entrust the implementation of that
system to a regulatory body which is effectively separate from any
body concerned with the promotion of nuclear energy. This should
be a significant step forward for the former Soviet bloc nations, in
which nuclear regulatory agencies have traditionally been
dominated by officials with a vested interest in the status quo in the
nuclear industry.

4. Conventions on Nuclear Liability
(i) The Paris and Vienna Conventions

The oldest conventions relating to the nuclear industry are
concerned with questions of liability. The Paris 75 and Vienna76
Conventions on liability for nuclear damage provide that individual
operators will be liable for damage to or loss of life or property
resulting from an incident at their nuclear installations. The two
conventions were substantially the same but had different
signatories. They have recently been reconciled so that a party to
one of the conventions can be liable to a signatory of the other,
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through the Vienna Protocol. 77 The glaring problem with these
conventions is that essential states, including Russia and the Ukraine
(or the u.s.S.R., at the time of the conventions' creation), are not
party to the agreements.

(ii) Significance of the Liability Issue
The liability issue points up the competition between the values of
state sovereignty and of international cooperation. Some argue that
the present lack of effective liability schemes should be replaced by
a fairly strict system of international strict liability for nuclear
damage. This argument is supported by the view that "international
strict liability functions as an essential corrective to the
socioeconomic imbalance which inevitably arises between those
States that engage in transnationally hazardous activities and those
that do not yet [but] are exposed to the risks created by others." 78
While this "deep-pockets" justification may seem appropriate in the
context of offending states such as the u.s., it is doubtful whether it
has any application to financially bereft states such as the ones in the
former Soviet Union. On the other hand, it is interesting that
during the aftermath of Chernobyl, many states such as West
Germany, which could justifiably have brought claims for damage
against the u.s.s.R., did not do so. Many feel that the reluctance to
press such claims was the result of the knowledge that many other
countries were in the same position as the Soviet Union was; an
accident like Chernobyl could just as easily have happened in West
Germany, and it still could happen in many countries outside the
CIS. Thus, countries were "not very willing to throw stones at other
glass houses" for fear of creating "normative boomerangs" which
could come back to haunt them if a catastrophe were to eventually
occur on their own territory. 79 This could even be an indication that
the acceptability of nuclear damage is actually rising in the
77
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international community, contrary to what would seem to be the
logical reaction.
5. Ocean Dumping Convention

As noted above, regulation of marine dumping of radioactive
wastes is also an important aspect of the control of the nuclear
industry. With the entry into force of the London Dumping
Convention (now called the London Convention 1972), 80 the
marine disposal of high-level radioactive wastes was prohibited
under international law. Further, a voluntary moratorium on lowlevel radioactive ocean dumping was entered into by the parties in
1983 and again in 1985. In 1993, that moratorium was converted
into an initial twenty-five year ban, subject to scientific study and
review at that time. 81 The effectiveness of these types of agreements
is called into question by the fact that in both 1983 and 1985, the
u.s. voted against the voluntary moratoria and the u.s.s.R. abstained
from the vote, claiming simply that it had never engaged in such
dumping and had no plan to do so in the future. That this was
nothing short of a lie was revealed in 1991, as mentioned above,
when the Soviets revealed their history of marine dumping. It
became evident that the dumping had been in violation of several
international agreements, including the original London
Convention and the two voluntary moratoria. 82 Again in 1993,
Russia abstained from the vote to ban low-level radioactive
dumping (along with Belgium, China, France, and the United
Kingdom), and provided the parties with formal notice of its
nonacceptance of the ban and of its simple inability to comply with
it. 83 This amounts to a concession by the Russian government that
its facilities for dealing with radioactive waste are so inadequate as
to leave them no satisfactory alternative to continued ocean
dumping of low-level liquid wastes in the near future. 84
The international reaction to the revelation of Soviet dumping
in 1991 provides another interesting example of the difficulties of
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sanctioning nations for the violation of agreements such as the
London Convention. Although Norwegian Prime Minister Gro
Harlem Brundtland (whose environmental awareness can surely not
be doubted) stated that the practice constituted a security risk to
the people and natural biology of Northern waters, the only
sanction which was used was the imposition of a ban on Russian
nuclear icebreakers preventing them from picking up tourist
passengers at Norwegian ports! 85 Surely there are sanctions which
would be more deterrent, but there is little latitude for employing
them in a situation where the violating country has so few resources
to deal with the problem in the first place.
6. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaties
Nuclear non-proliferation treaties have also presented new problems
in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's breakup. As an example, the
Ukraine is now the world's third largest nuclear power, since it
inherited 1800 strategic nuclear warheads from 176 intercontinental
missiles and from air-launched cruise missiles from the Soviet
Union. 86 These warheads are reported to be poorly maintained and
decaying. The international community has pressured the
government to give up this stockpile of weapons, to which the
Ukraine had responded that it should receive approximately three
billion dollars (u.s.) in foreign aid in return. 87 The Ukrainian
Parliament finally ratified the START 188 arms reduction treaty in
February 1994, after a long political struggle. Since it had initially
imposed a long list of conditions to its compliance with START I, it
is unclear whether the Ukraine's ratification will mean full
compliance or not. 89 And after an even more concerted campaign of
international pressure, the Parliament ratified the Nuclear Non-
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Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 90 in December of 1994. The Ukraine's
reluctance stems in part from the fact that it has been asked to
relinquish its weapons to Russia, which has historically been its
aggressor and occupier. Its decision to ratify the NPT was
conditional upon promises of security from the u.s. and Russia, but
Ukraine's compliance with the treaty would undoubtedly be
jeopardized should the government feel threatened in any way by
Russia. 91 A plan with more foresight would perhaps have envisioned
the weapons being turned over to a neutral international body
rather than to a republic that the Ukraine sees as a potential threat
to its own future security. These examples provide a basic overview
of some of the problems with the limited scope and enforcement
capabilities of existing international regimes in the nuclear arena.

VII. CURRENT SOURCES OF FUNDING FOR
NUCLEAR CLEANUP

1. Current Funding Structure
It is clear that the countries facing the most severe problems of
nuclear cleanup and safety improvement need vast amounts of
money to accomplish these goals. In the case of the republics of the
former Soviet Union, these resources simply do not exist within the
countries, so that the aid of the international community is
desperately needed. As has been discussed, it is in the long-term
interests of foreign governments to provide such funding. Presently,
funding is made available to the states of the CIS on a piecemeal
basis and without any central coordination. Although there have
been many unilateral and multilateral efforts to aid the Ukraine, for
example, they seem to reflect the specific priorities of the donor
agencies or countries, and each package only addresses a limited
part of the overall problem. For instance, there is a British fund to
help the Ukraine develop the technology to restore contaminated
land; the u.s. has pledged to help upgrade safety standards at plants
and train operators; and the European Union has funded the
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continued treatment of ongoing medical problems resulting from
the accident. 92 Many of these aid packages have been motivated by
desires that are "anything but altruistic .... [A]ll are at least partly
motivated by a self-interested desire to be rid of the transboundary
effects of Russia's pollution." 93 Meanwhile, there has been no
comprehensive plan to address both the structural problems at the
root of disasters such as Chernobyl and measures to be taken in case
of another crisis.
2. The G-7 and the European Community

Major sources of funding include the G-7 and the European
Community (Ee). A few years ago, the EC pledged to provide $550
million of the $700 million that was recommended by the G-7 to
address urgent nuclear safety needs through 1994. It also sent the
first-ever on-site international team to the Ukraine and Russia
(although it demanded legal indemnification from the two states in
case of an accident during this mission since neither the Ukraine nor
Russia signed the Paris and Vienna Conventions on nuclear plant
operators' liability, as discussed above). 94 However, this amount
must be paltry in relation to the total amount which would be
needed to do a complete job of ensuring permanent reasonable
levels of safety of the nuclear industry in the former Soviet Union.
Even after the above EC commitment was made, the Ukraine still
claimed at the G-7 meeting in July 1995 that it needed more than
four billion dollars (Cdn) in order to shut down Chernobyl alone. 95
The Ukraine's Environment Minister placed the cost of shutting
down Chernobyl at about $5.4 billion (Cdn), 96 which would
include the cost of building a gas-fired replacement energy plant,
erecting a safer sarcophagus around the ruined reactor, managing
radioactive waste near the plant, and providing some type of
alternative work for the 12,000 employees who still depend on
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Chernobyl for their livelihoods. 97 The sheer amounts of money that
will be required over the long run will undoubtedly be staggering.
Meanwhile, other funds which the EC administers would, at first
glance, seem to be perfectly applicable to the present crisis in the
nuclear industry in Eastern Europe. For example, the PHARE and
98
TACIS
funds have been set up to aid in the rebuilding of states
recovering from the grip of communism. The TACIS provisions
seem comprehensive, but upon closer examination, they do not
allocate any aid specifically for environmental protection projects in
the beneficiary states. However, "energy and nuclear safety" is one
of the prescribed areas, so there may be some hope that aid focused
on nuclear safety will be forthcoming. 99
3. Effectiveness of Funding Programs

It seems that proposals to aid the republics of the former Soviet
Union often are discussed but do not materialize, or are not as
useful as they could be. A spokesman for the Russian ministry in
charge of the nuclear industry has complained that foreign
governments have thus far delivered little more than promises,
dozens of delegations, and plenty of unfriendly advice. 100 On a
1991 mission to the U.N. to solicit aid to deal with the aftereffects
of the Chernobyl disaster, the Ukrainian minister in charge of the
effort expressed frustration with the fact that u.N. members seemed
more concerned with current crises and were apathetic toward the
Chernobyl cleanup since they perceived the event as something that
had happened long in the past. This view, if it was indeed the
prevalent one, is both inaccurate and extremely dangerous. It is
made more perilous by the fact that many of the effects of the
disaster (such as the long-term health effects on the survivors, and
the viability of the sarcophagus surrounding the ruined reactor) are
as yet unknown. IOI The actual effect of bilateral aid agreements is
also difficult to assess. For example, a 1993 article pointed out that
97
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less than five percent of the $800 million which the u.s. Congress
had designated up to that date for nuclear aid to Russia had been
formally obligated through signed contracts, and even less had
actually been spent. 102
Indirect sources of aid may also be less dependable than they
appear. For example, the IAEA has experienced budget problems
recently and announced in February 1992 that it would have to
postpone or cancel some important projects, which included
research into safe methods of handling nuclear waste. 103 Overall, the
funding picture for nuclear recovery in the CIS seems patchy and
provides no guarantees that aid will actually be effective. This is not
to say, however, that there is no hope; the number and varied types
of aid proposals do signal that the concern of the international
community is very real.

4. Developed or Developing?
In order to improve funding schemes, the international community
must answer the crucial question of how the states of the former
Soviet Union should be classified in terms of economic status.
Should they be considered developing countries, and thus be made
eligible for such programs as debt-for-nature swaps? The problem
with classifying the republics as "developing" is that although they
are experiencing many of the same economic hardships faced by
developing countries, they are fundamentally different from Third
World nations in that they possess a vast industrial base, more
complex environmental problems resulting from the presence of
those industries, and a relatively sophisticated pool of scientific and
technical knowledge within their borders. Thus, many international
agencies, such as the Global Environment Facility and the European
Community, have decided that the states of the former Soviet
Union are not eligible for aid directed at developing nations. 104
Countries in transition from socialism are "repeatedly overlooked
for environmental aid in favor of the developing nations in Asia and
Latin America." 105 Russian representatives at the 1992 Rio Earth
Summit succeeded only with great difficulty in seeing that the
102
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phrase "countries with an economy in a transitional mode" was
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important that the international community realize quickly that
these countries fall into a unique category with urgent needs as far
as economic development is concerned. Interestingly, some experts
feel that Russia may have the world's highest ecological efficiency
of capital investments, 107 probably because of its combination of
severe ecological problems, shortage of financial resources, and
scientific capability to effect change once funds are made available.
Therefore, if the international community neglects to direct aid to
states with transitional economies, they may be overlooking "the
wisest investment of their funds." 108

VII. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
1. The Need for Action at All Levels
It is evident that the states of the former Soviet Union need help at
the international level. Documents such as Agenda 21 demonstrate
the clear commitment of the international community to eventually
find solutions to the problems of nuclear safety and the
management of radioactive wastes. 109 However, it is equally clear
that the regulation of the nuclear industry requires legislative
attention within the republics before international instruments can
become fully meaningful or functional. As Patricia Birnie stated in a
general work on international environmental law, "the law does now
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provide many tools; it remains for states to get on with the job." 110
This feeling is echoed in the statements of the EC as well; an EC
representative stated, in relation to funding from sources such as
TACIS, discussed above:
The countries of central and eastern Europe can count on
considerable support from the European Community.
But if the countries do not themselves integrate
sustainable development and nature conservation
objectives into their own national policies, it will be very
difficult for the Community to assist. 111

The need for cooperation has been called for in many contexts. It
has been said that cooperative action is required, for instance, to
improve "the existing patchwork of national, regional, and global
control regimes aimed at marine radioactivity." 112 This cooperation
would necessarily involve a harmonization of rules and laws between
and among national jurisdictions and at the international level, as
well as the development of multilateral programs concentrating on
recovery, cleanup, enforcement of standards, and liability for
damage caused by contamination. But, many feel harmonization
must not go too far: Because laws in a given jurisdiction must be
finely tuned to the populations for which they are designed, it is
dangerous to try and homogenize them on an international level.
There is even concern that such a harmonization would result in the
lowest common denominator being adopted by countries during
the process of negotiations, so that the standards of many countries
would actually drop. 113
However, in the context of nuclear safety, it is manifest that
certain minimum standards must be enforceable across a large
number of jurisdictions in order for the international community to
have some sense of security. It is essential that nations be
encouraged to adopt internal laws incorporating such minimum
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standards, but it must also be recognized that the full scope of the
law should be determined by the individual country, thus
respecting the decision-making sovereignty of that state. Advice of
nations more advanced in environmental protection must not
devolve into paternalism; suggestions will be rejected by states if
they are born of good intentions but not of thorough knowledge of
local conditions. 114 The importance of local input was recognized in
an article concerning the future of Lake Baikal, a national treasure in
Siberia which has become notoriously contaminated as a result of
the industrial development on its shores. The concept might apply
equally to, for example, an area with a nuclear facility in its midst.
The author suggested that
[t]he people of Baikal who have lived with the lake for
generations understand it best and ought to be allowed
to decide its fate .... the international environmental
community should merely offer its technological and
legal expertise and funding, leaving ultimate decisions to
the people who live around the lake. Local people should
both form the laws and comprise the body that enforces
them. 115

2. Positive Steps in National Legislation
(i) Generally

Thus far, the new republics of the crs have taken some positive steps
toward enacting legislation which will enable them to tackle the
cleanup and continued regulation of nuclear industry in an effective
manner. Russia will be examined as the most accessible (and, it
would seem, the most advanced) of the republics in this area.
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(ii) The Law on Protection of the Environment

In a general vein, the Yeltsin government adopted the Law on

Protection of the Environment (LPE) in late 1991. 116 It establishes a
command-control system of environmental regulation and defines
areas of responsibility for central, provincial, and local governments.
However, law enforcement is still at a very low level of effectiveness,
and the LPE is merely a framework which requires regulations which
will eventually set actual standards and enforcement mechanisms.
Although regulations in several areas have been enacted pursuant to
the LPE, they have come amongst a flood of new legislation in the
federation, and enforcement resources will undoubtedly be
allocated to other subjects with higher priority than the
environment, at least in the near term. There are also many
ambiguities and even contradictions in the regulations, since
regulations for each subject area were enacted separately and at
different times. The new legislation also requires a complete
overhaul of the judicial system and the retraining of lawyers to deal
with the statute. 117 Even where convictions are obtained, most
debtors cannot pay their fines anyway; and if they can, there is little
deterrent effect because many enterprises find it more profitable to
simply pay their fines than to clean up their technology. These
problems are reminiscent of the problems which existed in the
Soviet Union. There is still a sense that it would be unwise to charge
businesses the real cost of the damage that they cause to the
environment, because in that case, "Russia would have to 'let go of
half its industry, if not more." 118 Another source suggests that if the
law was strictly enforced, it would require the immediate closure of
eighty percent of Russia's factories. 119
(iii) The Proposed Nuclear Waste Law

A second piece of legislation proposed by the Russian Parliament in
1992, was more specifically directed toward the regulation of
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nuclear waste. 120 The objective of the proposed Nuclear Waste Law
is "to ensure the safety of the population and the protection of the
environment 'through the safe isolation of radioactive wastes, which
prevents them from entering the environment during collection,
.
. 1.'" 121 The propose d 1aw,
treatment, transportat10n,
storage an d b una
which was drafted with the help of American groups, represents
significant progress in encouraging the free flow of information
about the nuclear industry within the country and involving the
public in decisions on nuclear safety. It also envisioned a system in
which all handlers of nuclear waste would be required to be licensed
by the state, vastly improving the probability that the government
could exercise effective control over those handlers. The proposed
law also stated that approved environmental assessments would be
required before storage facilities and repositories could be sited; the
required process even included public hearings. A final section of
the proposed law articulated the state's intent to take measures
consistent with international law, and with a view towards
international cooperation on nuclear subjects. 122 However, political
struggles over the breadth of the Nuclear Waste Law have followed
its proposal, and in late 1993, President Yeltsin abolished the
Russian Parliament before the bill had been enacted. It is to be
hoped that the proposed Nuclear Waste Law will serve as a
prototype for future comprehensive legislation. 12 3 Unless the
republics of the former u.s.s.R. move forward with the passage of
laws similar to this one, which attempt to significantly improve the
regulation of environmental matters, there will be little hope that
the international community will blindly pour urgently needed
funds into the republics.

120

Ibid. at 368. A Lexis online country file search, current to December l, 1995,
also showed no record that the law had been passed.
121
Ibid. at 425. Quoting Draft Law of the Russian Federation, "On State Policy
for Handling Nuclear Waste," 1992.
122
Ibid. at 425-428.
123 No record that such a law had been passed in Russia was Found in a Lexis
online country file search current to December l, 1995.

THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE FORMER USSR

201

3. The needs of the international community
(i) Generally

Before it will be willing to truly commit to thoroughgoing
assistance of the magnitude that is required in the CIS, the
international community will need to be assured of certain
improvements in the current nuclear situation there. The outside
world will demand the knowledge that there is a strong internal
system of laws, ensuring that compliance with minimum standards
will be a realistic goal, as discussed above. Another concern which
the IAEA has already partly addressed is the lack of information
surrounding the nuclear industry in the former Soviet Union which
so impeded the international community's response to the
Chernobyl disaster. The Early Notification agreement, discussed
previously, does make progress in this area, but work still needs to
be done in order to find a dispute resolution mechanism which will
be acceptable to all parties. An additional goal which is closely
linked with better notification systems is the internationalization of
scientific and technical research in the nuclear realm, which would
benefit all nations in that it would eliminate duplication of research
and speed up the progress of improvements to, for example, unsafe
reactors. The problem of potentially dangerous reactors is certainly
not limited to the former Soviet Union, so many countries using
nuclear technology would be aided by more open communication.

(ii) Resolution ofLiability Issues
The international community also needs an indication that states
will accept some responsibility for damage caused by nuclear
incidents. The liability issue is a sensitive and complex one; it is
evident that some solution is needed, not just in the context of
long-range effects of accidents such as Chernobyl, but so that
scientific aid and safety inspection missions can safely be sent to the
CIS to work on nuclear reactors there. The nuclear industry in the
West has indicated its willingness to help in retrofitting reactors to
make them more safe, but this has been on condition that it will be
indemnified against claims for compensation if damage was caused
at plants where their supplies or services have been used. 124 It is seen
as important by many that operators of nuclear facilities be
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personally tied to the failure to operate safely, in order to encourage
a higher level of compliance with international standards. This type
of liability, it has been suggested, should also extend to minimum
security standards at nuclear facilities, which would help calm
international fears about access to nuclear materials by, for example,
terrorists. 125
It must be recognized that many of the desires of the
international community are, indeed, somewhat selfish ones, but
this must be accepted as a fact of life: whether their motives are
altruistic or not, they are being driven to aid the situation in the CIS,
which can benefit all nations in the long run. However, the
international community must also strive not to engage in
paternalism or coercion; cooperation must be encouraged, as well as
the recognition of a respectable level of state sovereignty.

4. The needs of the CIS republics
(i) Effective Aid with Local Input
As has already been noted, the new republics need to have their
sovereignty respected, and local and regional authorities must be
involved in the creation of new legal norms in order for any regime
to be ultimately successful. At the same time, vast amounts of
money from foreign sources and technical assistance are desperately
needed. Donors of aid should allow the national governments some
discretion in deciding how the money which they receive should be
spent, and yet it is to be hoped that there could be some measure of
certainty that the money would be used for effective projects. One
possible solution to this conundrum is that, in the initial stages at
least, aid packages should emphasize the training or retraining of
personnel within the republics and the provision of necessary
technology with a view to the hope that the countries could
eventually, given such tools, carry out measures themselves. 126
(ii) Strengthening International Institutions
A former member of the Soviet Congress of Peoples' Deputies
suggested that the focus should be not on economic aid but on the
strengthening of international institutions for environmental
125
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protection. For example, he proposed that an international
ecological school be created and promoted, and that an
international environmental inspection system and tribunal should
be established. 127 These suggestions would indeed be particularly
useful in the context of the nuclear industry. There are private, nonprofit organizations in existence which are independently striving
towards the goal of providing effective technical assistance; one
such organization is ECOLOGIA (Ecologists Linked for Organizing
Grassroots Initiatives and Action). This organization was founded
in 1989 in order to support grassroots environmental organizations
in the former Soviet Union, and has now expanded its mandate to
offer "technical and humanitarian assistance to people of those
nations emerging from the ecological effects of Soviet history." 128
Although the organization was started by American grassroots
activists, it seeks to recruit local scientists and activists of the highest
calibre in each of the areas where it does its work, so that it is not
perceived as a foreign element lacking understanding of local issues.
It focuses not on political assistance to NGOs within the former
Soviet Union but on providing access to high-quality monitoring
equipment and a wide range of technical information services. In
this way, they hope to fill a unique (and likely very wide) niche in
the states of the former u.s.s.R ..
Another organization, this one sponsored by the American
government, was proposed during the Bush years. The Regional
Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe supports
information collection and dissemination, institution building,
emergency preparedness, and environmental education work. It is
also engaged in providing support in the areas of environmental
health, energy efficiency, pollution prevention, and agriculture. The
Center also claims to be creating and strengthening links between
government, business, and environmental groups, a goal which is of
unquestionable value in promoting environmental progress. 129 It is
suggested that more organizations such as these are needed, perhaps
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with a focus on the nuclear industry and utilizing the monetary
resources of the IAEA (and thus the u.N.).
5. A New Central Nuclear Authority

The need for greater coordination among the republics of the
former Soviet Union has been noted many times. Even during the
Soviet period, coordination between the various levels of
government was a constant struggle and made the regulation of the
nuclear industry extremely difficult. However, now that the central
Soviet government is gone, there is an even greater vacuum of
coordination. Robert Temple suggests that the most workable
method of achieving nuclear regulation in the CIS lies in the creation
of a central nuclear authority. 130 Although the IAEA can perform a
coordinating role to a certain extent, it has not yet demonstrated
the ability to do so in a way which is particularly well-suited to the
region in question. An organization similar to Euratom could be
established, with a geographical focus on the former Soviet Union,
and it could work in tandem with the IAEA as does Euratom. Such
an organization is urgently needed in order to focus on the
problems which are unique to the nuclear industry in the CIS, and to
create more specific solutions, tailored to the needs of individual
countries and regions, than an international agency could. It could
organize the support which the republics urgently need, including
scientific, technical, informational, and financial aid. Donor
countries and organizations would feel more secure in contributing
funds and effort to the cause of cleaning up the post-Soviet nuclear
mess if they knew that a central body was engaged in coordinating
that money and effort. Fears of redundant or imprudent use of
resources would ideally be eliminated. The creation of a central
authority would allow for the prioritization of resources which
become available in order to ensure that the most urgent problems
get solved first. 131
At the same time, such an approach would also allow for some
resources to be allocated to the root causes of the problems, such as
improving administrative law structures and developing alternative
energy sources, which may not be targeted as important goals by
donors which are farther removed from the CIS. A holistic approach
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to the problems, which is presently lacking, could thus be achieved.
The creation of a central agency would also be much more costeffective, Temple notes, than having each republic create the
support network necessary to oversee cleanup efforts. 132 The central
organization should, as far as possible, be apolitical, so as to alleviate
fears of bias or domination by a particular state in the allocation
process. It should involve environmental activists, scientists, and
public representatives from each region involved.

IX. CONCLUSION: THE SYNTHESIS OF
COMPETING PHILOSOPHIES

1. Generally

In seeking the solutions outlined above, the goal of achieving
sustainable development for all nations of the world may often
conflict with the desire of individual states to retain some degree of
sovereignty over their own affairs. A closer examination of these
points of view reveals some of the underlying issues in the struggle
which is unfolding in the regulation of the nuclear industry.
2. Recognition of Ecological Sovereignty
First, the reality in the states of the former Soviet Union is that
"[e]cological sovereignty has become an integral part of the idea of
state sovereignty in every republic." 133 In fact, each republic adopted
a declaration of sovereignty in 1990, and each of these documents
affirmed the right of the republic to control its own natural
resources and environmental protection measures. 134 Earlier in the
paper, the manner in which ecological concerns became identified
with nationalist causes in the republics was outlined. It is clear that
particular sensitivity must be shown to the c1s states in approaching
questions of international environmental regulation, and that the
nuclear industry must be dealt with especially carefully in light of
its economic importance to the republics.
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3. Attacking the Deeper Problems

Because of the fragile political and economic situations in the CIS, it
must be recognized that environmental concerns will not always be
given priority by national governments. At present, Russians, for
example, are less concerned with the environment than with the
botched war in Chechnya, charges of corruption among highranking government officials, the break-neck pace of economic
reforms, and the failure of the government to pay wages and
pensions on time. These are issues which have placed Boris Yeltsin a
distant fourth or fifth in most opinion polls regarding the
presidential election to be held in June, 1996. 135 These same issues
are also the basis of the Communist Party's tremendous resurgence
in popularity and could lead to the election of its leader, Gennady
Zyuganov, as President. It is unclear what, if any, priority would be
given to environmental issues by the Communist Party if it were
elected.
It is true that "sustainable development is possible only where
there is no urfent and immediate need for non-sustainable
development." 13 In other words, if nations are not given aid to
restructure basic economic and political systems which are causing
inefficiency and hardship, there can be no progress on the
environmental front. Thus, international aid must address broader
problems at the same time as it looks at environmental questions.
This is not to say, however, that environmental work can or must
wait until after the political and economic picture is stabilized. This
is particularly clear in relation to the nuclear industry, where the
environmental risks are enormous and growing more serious with
each passing day. As one author pointed out, a long series of
decisions to put off environmental restoration until after the
economy was fully recovered are a product of precisely the type of
thinking which got Eastern Europe into the environmental mess in
which it presently finds itself. 137 In fact, economic cost-benefit
analyses only form a part of the justification for taking
environmental action; there is also a higher ethical imperative to
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promote the survival of the human species by correcting the
imbalance between nature and humankind. 138

4. Sovereignty and Sustainability
The desire to achieve global environmental sustainability is often
cited as cause for imposing international minimum standards on
activities, such as the nuclear industry, which pose significant risks
on a global basis. While it is important to recognize state
sovereignty, the international community must decide how many
of the crucial decisions relating to the nuclear industry can safely be
left up to national governments. The challenge facing individual
nations in balancing their own interests with those of the
international community is symbolized by two elements found
within a single key provision of the 1992 Rio Declaration. 139
Principle 2 of the Declaration provides that states have the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources "pursuant to their own
environmental and development policies." However, that right is
qualified by the obligation to ensure that "activities within their
jurisdiction and control do not cause damage to the environment of
other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."
The obligation upon nations to remain environmental "good
neighbors" converges with the fact that sound environmental
decisions will be beneficial in the long term to all states, even those
which may be reluctant to make them for economic or other
reasons. This concept reflects the "common heritage" approach to
environmentalism, which theorizes that sovereignty "is obsolete and
should be replaced by a concept of planetary citizenship." 140 While
it is unlikely that this approach will be embraced wholeheartedly,
there is hope that a balance between sovereignty and sustainability
will be achieved. The question of how to approach nuclear
regulation in a region such as the former Soviet Union is only one
example of the array of problems facing the international
community in resolving these issues.
Clearly, the time is ripe for international environmental law to
have an increased role in the former Soviet Union. A coordinating
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central authority which would oversee the allocation of resources,
encourage the incorporation of minimum international standards
in to effective and enforceable national laws, and encourages
multilateral cooperation would be an important step in the process
of cleaning up the aftermath of the Soviet nuclear frenzy. It is to be
hoped that an acceptable threshold of state sovereignty can be
maintained while providing the young nations of the CIS with the
aid which they desperately need. It is only in this way that the path
to safety in the nuclear industry, and thus the road to global
environmental sustainability, can be made clearer.

